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Abstract
We introduce an atomic congestion game with two types of agents, cars and trucks, to model
the traffic flow on a road over various time intervals of the day. Cars maximize their utility
by finding a trade-off between the time they choose to use the road, the average velocity of
the flow at that time, and the dynamic congestion tax that they pay for using the road. In
addition to these terms, the trucks have an incentive for using the road at the same time as their
peers because they have platooning capabilities, which allow them to save fuel. The dynamics
and equilibria of this game-theoretic model for the interaction between car traffic and truck
platooning incentives are investigated. We use traffic data from Stockholm to validate parts of
the modeling assumptions and extract reasonable parameters for the simulations. We use joint
strategy fictitious play and average strategy fictitious play to learn a pure strategy Nash equi-
librium of this game. We perform a comprehensive simulation study to understand the influence
of various factors, such as the drivers’ value of time and the percentage of the trucks that are
equipped with platooning devices, on the properties of the Nash equilibrium.
Keywords: Heavy-Duty Vehicle Platooning, Atomic Congestion Game, Pure Strategy Nash
Equilibrium, Learning Algorithm.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Urban traffic congestion creates many problems, such as increased transportation delays and fuel
consumption, air pollution, and dampened economic growth in heavily congested areas [3–5]. A
recent study [5] shows that the transportation has contributed to approximately 15% of the total
man-made carbon-dioxide since preindustrial era and suggests that it will be responsible for roughly
16% of the carbon-emission over the next century. To circumvent part of these issues, the local
governments in some urban areas introduced congestion taxes to manage the traffic congestion over
existing infrastructures. For instance, Stockholm implemented a congestion taxing system in August,
2007 after a seven-month trial period in 2006. A survey of the influence of the congestion taxes over
the trial period can be found in [6], which shows significant improvements in travel times as well
as favorable economic and environmental effects. Behavioral aspects and other influences of the
Stockholm congestion taxing system is discussed in [7–10].
In parallel to reducing the congestion, we can employ other means to improve the fuel efficiency
and decrease the carbon emission [3]. One way to improve the fuel efficiency of vehicles is platooning,
as vehicles experience a reduced air drag force when they travel in platoons [11–15]. Trucks or heavy-
duty vehicles can significantly improve their fuel efficiency by platooning with their peers. In [11],
the authors report 4.7%-7.7% reduction in the fuel consumption (depending on the distance between
the vehicles among other factors) when two identical trucks move close to each other at 70 km/h.
In a futuristic scenario when several trucks are equipped with platooning devices, they are able to
save fuel by cooperating with each other. However, implementing truck platooning in a large-scale
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setup is not easy since a global decision-maker might become complex and the vehicles can belong
to competing entities. In addition, it is interesting to study if a desirable behavior can emerge from
simple local strategies. In this paper, we consider such a case where the traffic flow can be modeled
as a congestion game and the desired behavior corresponds to an equilibrium of this game.
1.2 Related Studies
Modeling the traffic flow using congestion games or routing games is a well-known problem [16–24].
Rosenthal [19] presented a noncooperative game in which a finite number of players compete for
using a finite set of resources with application to modeling transport networks. He showed that a
class of these games admit at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium (an action profile in which
no agent has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from her action). Later, the authors of [25] showed
that atomic congestion games are indeed potential games (i.e., there exists a potential function, such
that its variation when only one agent changes her action is equal to the variation of the utility
of the corresponding agent) under some conditions and, hence, one can find a Nash equilibrium by
minimizing the potential function. For a survey of these and related results, see [26]. Most of these
studies modeled the route selection using an atomic congestion game. Recently, the authors of [27]
utilized a congestion game for modeling instead the time interval in which drivers decide to use a
road.
This setup may be extended to weighted congestion games in which every agent is associated
with a (splittable or unsplittable) demand (not equal and more than a single unit) that should be
routed over the network. In [28], Rosenthal showed that a Nash equilibrium does not necessarily
exist in these games if the agents can split their demand. The authors of [29–31] constructed
counterexamples to show that a Nash equilibrium does not necessarily exist also for unsplittable
demands as well. However, when cost functions (i.e., latencies) of each road are affine functions, an
equilibrium certainly exists (and may be found in pseudo-polynomial time) [30]. In [29], it was also
proved that an equilibrium may exist for a special class of cost functions (that are only a function
of the residual capacity on each edge) on parallel networks. The largest class of latency functions
for which the game admits an equilibrium were explored in [32]. It was also shown that a weighted
congestion game admits an exact potential function (a weighted potential function) if and only if the
set of costs contains only affine functions (affine or exponential functions) [33].
The studies discussed above mainly consider homogeneous congestion games in which all the
drivers on a road at any given time interval perceive the same cost function (e.g, the drivers only
consider the latency in their decision-making and they all have the same sensitivity to the latency as
well). However, in road traffic networks, this assumption might not be realistic. For instance, as we
will see in this paper, whenever the drivers include the fuel consumption in their decision making,
trucks and cars potentially have different cost functions even if they observe the same latency when
using the road. To capture this phenomenon, we extend the model in [27] to an atomic congestion
game with two types of agents, namely, cars and trucks. Notice that the problem of heterogeneous
congestion and routing games have been studied extensively in the past [34–36]. For instance,
in [34], the author formulated a congestion game in which each player has a specific cost function
that depends on the congestion. In that study, it was shown that every unweighted congestion
game with player-specific cost functions admits at least one equilibrium; however, this results may
not be generalized to weighted congestion games with player-specific cost functions in general. In
addition, generally, even unweighted congestion games with player-specific cost functions do not
admit a potential function. For routing games, in which a continuum of players route an infinitesimal
amount of flow, it was proved that a potential function exists if a symmetry condition is satisfied for
the cost functions (i.e., various classes of agents bother or delight each other equally) [35,37]. A class
of necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of potential functions was presented in [38].
Conditions for the (essential) uniqueness of the equilibrium in multi-class routing games were also
presented in [39,40].
Motivated by the fact that the Nash equilibrium is generally inefficient, the price of anarchy
(i.e., the worst-case ratio of the social welfare function for a Nash equilibrium over the social welfare
function for a socially optimal solution) of atomic congestion games with linear latency functions
was studied in [41]. Several studies have proposed congestion taxes (also known as tolls) to improve
the social cost function when all the agents are equally sensitive to the proposed taxes [42–45] as
well as when they have different sensitivities [46–49]. For instance, in [49], tolls were introduced to
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minimize the total travel time and the total travel cost (as a bi-objective optimization problem). This
setup was generalized in [47] to also admit entities that own several agents (and wish to optimize
the combined utility of those agents). The idea of maximizing the reserve capacity of the network
was approached in [46]. A scenario in which the network is managed by several decision-makers
(with conflicting objectives) across various regions was discussed in [48]. The authors of [27, 42, 43]
presented congestion taxes so that the underlying congestion game admits the social welfare as
a potential function. This is certainly of interest because it guarantees that the socially optimal
decision is also a Nash equilibrium. However, in those studies, the authors needed to introduce a
congestion tax for all the agents (and not only a subset of them).
1.3 Contributions
In this paper, we model the traffic flow at non-overlapping intervals of the day using an atomic1
congestion game with two types of agents. The agents of the first type are cars as well as trucks
that do not have platooning equipments. For the sake of brevity, we call all these agents cars. They
optimize their utility, which is a sum of the penalty for deviating from their preferred time for using
the road, the average velocity of the traffic flow along the road, and the congestion tax that they
pay for using the road at that time interval. The agents of the second type are trucks equipped with
platooning devices. For the sake of brevity, we call these agents trucks. In addition to the above
mentioned terms, they have an incentive for using the road with other trucks (due to an increased
chance for platooning and, hence, reducing their fuel consumption).
We model the average velocity of the flow at each time interval as an affine function of the
number of the vehicles that are using the road at that time interval. We use real traffic data from
the northbound E4 highway from Lilla Essingen to the end of Fredha¨llstunneln in Stockholm to
validate this modeling assumption.
We determine a necessary condition for the existence of a potential function for the introduced
atomic congestion game with two types of agents and use this condition to prove that in general
the congestion game is not a potential game. Therefore, we devise appropriate congestion taxes
(specifically, a congestion taxing policy for cars and a platooning subsidy for trucks) to guarantee
the existence of a potential function. Based on this result, we prove that the atomic congestion game
admits at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium under the proposed congestion tax–subsidy policy.
Equipped with these results, we use joint strategy fictitious play and average strategy fictitious play
to learn a Nash equilibrium. Intuitively, we interpret the learning algorithm as the way drivers decide
on a daily basis to choose the time interval on which they are using the road by optimizing their
utility given the history of their actions. Iterating over days, the drivers’ decisions (i.e., the profile of
the learning algorithm) converges almost surely to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Note that the
potential games are certainly not the only classes of games for which variants of the fictitious play
(e.g., joint strategy fictitious play) may converge to an equilibrium. To mention a few example, the
authors of [25, 52] introduced ordinal potential games and weighted potential games as two families
of games for which the fictitious play converges in beliefs to a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. For
(generalized) ordinal potential games, one may also deduce the convergence of the joint strategy
fictitious play to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium with probability one [42]. These families of games
are certainly more general than (exact) potential games. In this paper, as a starting point, we present
necessary conditions for the existence of (exact) potential functions as well as imposing congestion
taxes for guaranteeing the existence of such functions. Although conservative, this approach perhaps
can be justified in the introduced problem due to the existence of intuitive taxing and subsidy policies
(see Subsection 3.2). A viable direction for future work is to investigate necessary and sufficient
conditions so that a congestion game belongs to the category of ordinal or weighted potential games.
In addition, as also mentioned earlier, congestion taxes were presented in [27, 42, 43] so that the
congestion game admits the social welfare as a potential function. However, in contrast to the
results of this paper, the authors of [42, 43] introduced a congestion tax for all the agents (and not
only a subset of them) to improve the efficiency and considered homogeneous congestion games (with
only one type of agents).
Finally, using the parameters extracted from the real congestion data, we construct a simulation
setup to study the performance of the learning algorithms as well as the properties of the Nash
1We use the term atomic to emphasize the fact that we are not dealing with a continuum of players or fractional
flows when modeling the traffic flow as a congestion game [50,51].
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equilibrium. For instance, we study the robustness to perturbations of the learning algorithm, e.g.,
accidents along the road, sudden weather changes, or temporary road constructions. We also consider
the case when the drivers value their time differently, where the values are motivated by survey data
from Stockholm area [53].
1.4 Paper Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the considered congestion
game. We find a necessary condition of the existence of a potential function in Section 3. In Sections 4
and 5, we respectively introduce the joint strategy fictitious play and the average strategy fictitious
play to learn a Nash equilibrium of the congestion game. Finally, we present the simulations in
Section 6 and conclude the paper in Section 7.
1.5 Notation
Let R, Z, and N denote the sets of real, integer, and natural numbers, respectively. Furthermore, let
N0 = N ∪ {0}. We define JNK = {1, . . . , N} for any N ∈ N. In this paper, all other sets are denoted
by calligraphic letters such as R. We use |R| to denote the cardinality of R. Finally, we define the
characteristic function 1x=y (1x≥y) to be equal one whenever x = y (x ≥ y) holds true and to be
equal to zero otherwise.
2 Game-Theoretic Model
We model the traffic flow at certain time intervals of the day on a given road using an atomic
congestion game. The agents in this congestion game are the vehicles (or, rather the drivers of these
vehicles) and their actions are the time intervals that they choose to use the road at each day. Let
us divide the time of the day into R ∈ N non-overlapping intervals and denote each interval by ri
for i ∈ JRK. The set of all these intervals (i.e., agents’ actions) is denoted by R = {r1, r2, . . . , rR}.
We consider the case where the underlying congestion game is composed of two types of agents. As
specified in the introduction, we name the agents of the first type cars and the agents of the second
type trucks throughout the paper. We assume N cars and M trucks are playing in this congestion
game and denote the actions of the cars and the trucks by z = {zi}Ni=1 and x = {xi}Mi=1, respectively.
Let us describe the utilities of the cars and the trucks in the following subsections.
2.1 Car Utility
Car i ∈ JNK maximizes its utility given by
Ui(zi, z−i, x) = ξci (zi, T
c
i ) + vzi(z, x) + p
c
i (z, x), (1)
where the mapping ξci : R × R → R describes the penalty for deviating from the preferred time
interval for using the road denoted by T ci ∈ R (e.g., due to being late for work or delivering goods),
vzi(z, x) is the average velocity of the traffic flow at time interval zi, and p
c
i (z, x) is a potential
congestion tax for using the road on a specific time interval.
Following [27, 54, 55], we assume that vr(z, x) (i.e., the average velocity at time interval r ∈ R)
is linearly dependent on the road congestion
nr(z, x) =
N∑
`=1
1{z`=r} +
M∑
`=1
1{x`=r}, (2)
which is the total number of vehicles (both cars and trucks) that are using the road at r ∈ R. Let us
use real traffic data from sensors on the northbound E4 highway in Stockholm from Lilla Essingen
to the end of Fredha¨llstunneln (see Figure 1) to validate this assumption. The measurements are
extracted during October 1–15, 2012. Figure 2 illustrates the average velocity of the flow as a
function of the number of vehicles. As we can see, for up to 1000 vehicles, a linear relationship
vr(z, x) = anr(z, x) + b (3)
4
Figure 1: The dashed black curve shows the segment of northbound E4 highway between Lilla Essingen and
Fredha¨llstunneln in Stockholm where we are using to validate the model and extract reasonable parameters.
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Figure 2: Average velocity of the traffic flow as a function of the number of vehicles that are entering the segment of
northbound E4 highway between Lilla Essingen and Fredha¨llstunneln for 15 min time intervals.
with a = −0.0110 and b = 84.9696 describes the data well. However, for higher numbers of the
vehicles, it fails to capture the behavior of around 20% of the data (shown by the red dots in
Figure 2). Note that some of these outlier measurements can be caused by traffic accidents, sudden
weather changes during the day, or temporary road constructions. A viable direction for future work
is to introduce more complex velocity models in which the average velocity of the traffic flow may
depend on the number of vehicles in the neighboring time intervals in addition to the current one.
We may also need to separate the effect of cars and trucks as one may expect heavier and larger
vehicles to contribute more to the traffic congestion. However, in this paper, we use the simple model
presented in (3) and instead focus on platooning incentives.
The choice of the penalty mappings ξci , i ∈ JNK, does not change the theoretical results presented
in the paper, but it can capture various models of the drivers. For instance, following [27], we can
use ξci (zi, T
c
i ) = α
c
i |zi − T ci |, with scalar αci < 0, to describe the case where the driver of car i is
penalized by deviating from the preferred time interval. With this function, the driver get penalized
symmetrically no matter if she uses the road sooner or later than T ci . By increasing |αci |, she becomes
less flexible. Another penalty function is ξci (zi, T
c
i ) = α
c
i max(zi − T ci , 0), which penalizes the driver
of car i only for being late. For the simulations in the paper, we assume that all vehicles use the first
penalty mapping.
2.2 Truck Utility
Truck j ∈ JMK maximizes its utility given by
Vj(xj , x−j , z) = ξtj(xj , T
t
j ) + vxj (z, x) + p
t
i(z, x) + βvxj (z, x)g(mxj (x)), (4)
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where, similar to the utilities of the cars, ξtj(xj , T
t
j ) is the penalty for deviating from the preferred time
T tj for using the road, vxj (z, x) is the average velocity of the traffic flow, and p
t
i(z, x) is a potential
congestion tax for using the road at time interval xj . Trucks have an extra term βvxj (z, x)g(mxj (x))
in their utility because of their benefit in using the road at the same time as the other trucks.
Here, g : JMK → R is a nondecreasing function and mr(x) = ∑M`=1 1{x`=r} is the number of trucks
that are using the road at time interval r ∈ R. The increased utility can be justified by the fact
that whenever there are many trucks on the road at the same time interval, they can potentially
collaborate to form platoons and thereby increase the fuel efficiency. It should be noted that this extra
utility is a function of the average velocity of the flow since trucks cannot save a significant amount
of fuel through platooning whenever traveling at low velocities [11, 56]. The function g : JMK → R
describes the dependency of the platooning incentive on the number of trucks that are using the road
at that time interval. Again, the choice of this function does not change the mathematical results
presented in this paper, but it can help us to capture the relationship between the fuel saving and
the number of the trucks on the road. For instance, g(mxj (x)) = mxj (x) shows that the vehicles
can even benefit from a low number of trucks but g(mxj (x)) = mxj (x)1mxj (x)≥τ describes the case
where the trucks do not benefit until they reach a critical number τ ∈ N. For the simulations, we
use the first mapping.
Notice that in the utilities Ui in (1) and Vj in (4), we introduced congestion taxes for cars and
trucks. Later, they are used to ensure that the described game is a potential game. Such a game
admits at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium and we can use joint strategy fictitious play and
average strategy fictitious play to learn that equilibrium. A viable direction for future research could
be to design taxing policies so as to enforce a socially optimal behavior, such as an optimal carbon
emission profile, using mechanism design theory [57].
2.3 Congestion Game
Now, we are ready to define a congestion game with two types of players using normal-form repre-
sentation of strategic games [58,59].
Definition 1 (Car–Truck Congestion Game): A car–truck congestion game is defined as a
tuple G = ((R)N+Mi=1 ; ((Ui)Ni=1, (Vj)Mj=1)), that is, a combination of N +M players with action space
(R)N+Mi=1 and utilities ((Ui)Ni=1, (Vj)Mj=1)).
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium for a car–truck congestion game is a pair (z, x) ∈ RN × RM
such that
Ui(zi, z−i, x) ≥ Ui(z′i, z−i, x), ∀z′i ∈ R, i ∈ JNK,
Vj(xj , x−j , z) ≥ Vj(x′j , x−j , z), ∀x′j ∈ R, j ∈ JMK.
To prove the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium or to use various learning algorithms for
finding an equilibrium, we focus on a subclass of games, namely, potential games [25]. A car–truck
congestion game is a potential game with potential function Φ : RN ×RM → R if
Φ(x, zi, z−i)− Φ(x, z′i, z−i) = Ui(zi, z−i, x)− Ui(z′i, z−i, x), ∀i ∈ JNK,
Φ(xj , x−j , z)− Φ(x′j , x−j , z) = Vj(xj , x−j , z)− Vj(x′j , x−j , z), ∀j ∈ JMK.
With these definitions in hand, we are ready to present the results of the paper.
3 Existence of Potential Function
Atomic congestion games with one type of agents (corresponding to the case where M = 0 or N = 0)
are known to admit a potential function even without congestion taxes [25,27,45]. In this section, we
show that this property does not hold for car–truck congestion games unless we devise an appropriate
taxing scheme.
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3.1 Necessary Condition for the Existence of a Potential Function
Let Φ : RN × RM → R be a given mapping. Define
∆xj→x′jΦ(x, z) = Φ(x, z)− Φ(x′, z),
∆zi→z′iΦ(x, z) = Φ(x, z)− Φ(x, z′),
where x′ = (x′j , x−j) and z
′ = (z′i, z−i). Using simple algebra, we can show that the operators
commute, i.e.,
∆zi→z′i∆xj→x′jΦ(x, z) = ∆xj→x′j∆zi→z′iΦ(x, z).
Now, we are ready to prove the following useful result.
Proposition 1 A car–truck congestion game admits a potential function only if
∆xi→x′j∆zi→z′iVj(z, x) = ∆zi→z′i∆xi→x′jUi(z, x),
for all i ∈ JNK and j ∈ JMK.
Proof: Let Φ(x, z) be a potential function for the congestion game. Then, it must satisfy
∆xj→x′jVj(x, z) = ∆xj→x′jΦ(x, z). (5)
Let x′ = (x′j , x−j) and z
′ = (z′i, z−i). Again, when noting that Φ(x, z) is a potential function, we get
Φ(x, z) = Φ(x, z′) + ∆zi→z′iUi(z, x) (6a)
Φ(x′, z) = Φ(x′, z′) + ∆zi→z′iUi(z, x
′) (6b)
Substituting (6) into (5) results in
∆xj→x′jVj(x, z)=Φ(x, z)− Φ(x′, z)
=∆xj→x′jΦ(x, z
′) + ∆zi→z′iUi(z, x)−∆zi→z′iUi(z, x′)
=∆xj→x′jΦ(x, z
′)+∆zi→z′i∆xi→x′jUi(z, x)
=∆xj→x′jVj(x, z
′)+∆zi→z′i∆xi→x′jUi(z, x),
where the last equality follows from the definition of the potential function. Therefore, we get the
identity in the statement of the theorem. 
This shows that it might not be possible to find a potential functions for the congestion game
with two types of players.
Corollary 2 Let pci (z, x) = 0 for i ∈ JNK and ptj(z, x) = 0 for j ∈ JMK. A car–truck congestion
game admits a potential function only if β = 0 or g is equal to zero everywhere.
Proof: First, by simple algebraic manipulations, we prove the identity in
∆xi→x′j∆zi→z′iVj(z, x) = ∆xi→x′j∆zi→z′i
(
ξtj(xj , T
t
j ) + vxj (z, x) + βvxj (z, x)g(mxj (x))
)
= ∆xi→x′j∆zi→z′i
(
vxj (z, x) + βvxj (z, x)g(mxj (x))
)
= ∆xi→x′j
(
vxj (z, x)−vxj (z′, x)+βvxj (z, x)g(mxj (x))−βvxj (z′, x)g(mxj (x))
)
= ∆xi→x′j
(
a[1xj=zi − 1xj=z′i ][1− βg(mxj (x))]
)
= a[1xj=zi − 1xj=z′i ][1− βg(mxj (x))]− a[1x′j=zi − 1x′j=z′i ][1− βg(mx′j (x′))]
= a[1xj=zi + 1x′j=z′i − 1xj=z′i − 1x′j=zi ]
− aβ[1xj=zi − 1xj=z′i ]g(mxj (x)) + aβ[1x′j=zi − 1x′j=z′i ]g(mx′j (x′))
= a[1xj=zi + 1x′j=z′i − 1xj=z′i − 1x′j=zi ]
+ aβ[1xj=z′i1x′j=zi − 1xj=zi1x′j=z′i ][1− 1zj=z′i ][g(mxj (x)) + g(mx′j (x′))]
(7)
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Similarly, we can show that
∆zi→z′i∆xi→x′jUi(z, x) = a[1xj=zi + 1x′j=z′i − 1xj=z′i − 1x′j=zi ].
Therefore, following Proposition 1, the introduced congestion game admits a potential function only
if
β[1xj=z′i1x′j=zi − 1xj=zi1x′j=z′i ][1− 1zj=z′i ][g(mxj (x)) + g(mx′j (x′))] = 0
for all x, z and x′j , z
′
i. This is indeed only possible if β = 0 or if g is equal to zero everywhere. 
Potential games have many desirable attributes. For instance, these games always admit at least
one pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In addition, many learning algorithms, such as, joint strategy
fictitious play, are known to extract a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for potential games. Given
these important properties, a natural question that comes to mind is that whether it is possible to
guarantee the existence of a potential function by imposing appropriate congestion taxes. We answer
this question in the next subsection.
3.2 Imposing Taxes to Guarantee the Existence of a Potential Function
In this subsection, we propose a taxing and a subsidy policy that guarantee the existence of a
potential function for the car–truck congestion game.
Theorem 3 Let each car i ∈ JNK pay the congestion tax
pci (z, x) = aβ
mzi (x)∑
`=1
g(`), (8)
for using the road at time interval zi ∈ R. Then, the car–truck congestion game is a potential game
with the potential function
Φ(x, z) =
N∑
i=1
ξci (zi, T
c
i ) +
M∑
j=1
ξtj(xj , T
t
j ) +
R∑
r=1
nr(x,z)∑
k=1
(ak + b)
+
R∑
r=1
β(anr(x, z) + b)
mr(x)∑
`=1
g(`)− aβ
R∑
r=1
mr(x)∑
`=1
`−1∑
k=1
g(k).
Furthermore, this game admits at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof: The proof of this lemma follows the same line of reasoning as in the proof of Proposition
4.1 in [27]. First, we need to define the following notations
Φ1(x, z) =
N∑
i=1
ξci (zi, T
c
i ) +
M∑
j=1
ξtj(xj , T
t
j ),
Φ2(x, z) =
R∑
r=1
nr(x,z)∑
k=1
(ak + b),
Φ3(x, z) =
R∑
r=1
β(anr(x, z) + b)
mr(x)∑
`=1
g(`),
Φ4(x, z) = −aβ
R∑
r=1
mr(x)∑
`=1
`−1∑
k=1
g(k).
Let us start by analyzing the trucks. If xj = x
′
j , the result trivially holds. Consequently, we consider
the case where xj 6= x′j , which results in
Φ(xj , x−j , z)− Φ(x′j , x−j , z) =
4∑
k=1
Φk(xj , x−j , z)− Φk(x′j , x−j , z).
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We continue the proof by considering each term of this summation separately. For the first term,
clearly, we have
Φ1(xj , x−j , z)− Φ1(x′j , x−j , z) = ξtj(xj , T tj )− ξtj(x′j , T tj ).
Let us define x′ = (x′j , x−j). For the second term, we have
Φ2(xj , x−j , z)− Φ2(x′j , x−j , z) =
R∑
r=1
nr(x,z)∑
k=1
(ak + b)−
R∑
r=1
nr(x
′,z)∑
k=1
(ak + b)
=
nxj (x,z)∑
k=1
(ak + b) +
nx′
j
(x,z)∑
k=1
(ak + b)
−
nxj (x
′,z)∑
k=1
(ak + b)−
nx′
j
(x′,z)∑
k=1
(ak + b),
where the second equality holds because of the fact that nr(x, z) = nr(x
′, z) for all r 6= xj , x′j . Note
that
nxj (x
′, z) = nxj (x, z)−1, nx′j (x, z) = nx′j (x′, z)−1, (9)
and as a result,
Φ2(xj , x−j , z)− Φ2(x′j , x−j , z) = (anxj (z, x) + b)− (anx′j (z, x′) + b).
For the third term, we get the identity in
Φ3(xj , x−j , z)− Φ3(x′j , x−j , z) =
R∑
r=1
β(anr(x, z) + b)
mr(x)∑
`=1
g(`)−
R∑
r=1
β(anr(x
′, z) + b)
mr(x
′)∑
`=1
g(`)
= β(anxj (x, z) + b)
mxj (x)∑
`=1
g(`) + β(anx′j (x, z) + b)
mx′
j
(x)∑
`=1
g(`)
− β(anxj (x′, z) + b)
mxj (x
′)∑
`=1
g(`)−β(anx′j (x′, z) + b)
mx′
j
(x′)∑
`=1
g(`)
= β(anxj (x, z) + b)g(mxj (x))− β(anx′j (x′, z) + b)g(mx′j (x′))
+ aβ
mxj (x)−1∑
`=1
g(`)− aβ
mx′
j
(x′)−1∑
`=1
g(`),
(10)
where the last equality follows from using (9) and the fact that mxj (x
′) = mxj (x)− 1 and mx′j (x) =
mx′j (x
′)− 1. Finally, using the same argument as in the case of the second term and the third term,
we get
Φ4(xj , x−j , z)− Φ4(x′j , x−j , z) = −aβ
mxj (x)−1∑
`=1
g(`) + aβ
mx′
j
(x′)−1∑
`=1
g(`).
Combining all these differences, we get
Φ(xj , x−j , z)− Φ(x′j , x−j , z) =β(anxj (x, z) + b)g(mxj (x))− β(anx′j (x′, z)+b)g(mx′j (x′))
+ ξtj(xj , T
t
j )− ξtj(x′j , T tj ) + (anxj (z, x) + b)− (anx′j (z, x′) + b)
=Vj(xj , x−j , z)−Vj(x′j , x−j , z).
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Now, let us prove this fact for the cars as well. If zi = z
′
i, the result trivially holds. Thus, we
investigate the case where zi 6= z′i. Similarly, we consider each term of the summation separately.
For the first term, we have
Φ1(x, zi, z−i)− Φ1(x, z′i, z−i) = ξci (zi, T ci )− ξci (z′i, T ci ).
We define the notation z′ = (z′i, z−i). Following a similar reasoning as in the case of the trucks, for
the second and the third terms, we get
Φ2(x, zi, z−i)− Φ2(x, z′i, z−i) = (anzi(z, x) + b)− (anz′i(z′, x) + b),
and
Φ3(x, zi, z−i)−Φ3(x, z′i, z−i) = aβ
mzi (x)∑
`=1
g(`)− aβ
mz′
i
(x)∑
`=1
g(`).
For the forth term, we get Φ4(x, zi, z−i) − Φ4(x, z′i, z−i) = 0 since this term is only a function of x
which is not changed. Again, combining all these differences, we get
Φ(x, zi, z−i)− Φ(x, z′i, z−i) = (anzi(z, x) + b)− (anz′i(z′, x) + b) + ξci (zi, T ci )− ξci (z′i, T ci )
+ aβ
mzi (x)∑
`=1
g(`)− aβ
mz′
i
(x)∑
`=1
g(`)
=Ui(zi, z−i, x)− Ui(z′i, z−i, x).
Finally, note that every potential game admits at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium [25]. 
Remark 1 Note the tax pci (z, x) grows quadratically with the number of the trucks that are using
the road at that time interval if the mapping g : JMK → R is an affine function. Therefore, the
congestion tax policy pci (z, x) in Theorem 3 forces the cars to avoid the time intervals that the trucks
use to travel together.
Instead of taxing the cars, we can also introduce a platooning subsidy for the trucks to get a
potential game.
Theorem 4 Let each truck j ∈ JMK receive the subsidy
ptj(x, z) = β(v0 − (anxj (z, x) + b))mxj (x), (11)
for a given v0 ∈ R. Then, the car–truck congestion game is a potential game with the potential
function
Ψ(x, z) =
N∑
i=1
ξci (zi, T
c
i ) +
M∑
j=1
ξtj(xj , T
t
j ) +
R∑
r=1
nr(x,z)∑
k=1
(ak + b) + βv0
R∑
r=1
mr(x)∑
`=1
g(`).
Furthermore, this game admits at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Let us start with trucks. Note that with the introduced policy, the utility of truck j is equal
Vj(xj , x−j , z)=ξtj(xj , T
t
j )+vxj (z, x)+βv0g(mxj (x)).
Let us define x′ = (x′j , x−j). If xj = x
′
j , the result trivially holds. Therefore, without loss of
generality, we consider the case where xj 6= x′j . In what follows, we examine each term in the cost
function separately. First, we define Ψ1(x, z) =
∑N
i=1 ξ
c
i (zi, T
c
i ) +
∑M
j=1 ξ
t
j(xj , T
t
j ). Now, it is easy
to see that
Ψ1(x, z)−Ψ1(x′, z) = ξtj(xj , T tj )− ξtj(x′j , T tj ).
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Second, we define Ψ2(x, z) =
∑R
r=1
∑nr(x,z)
k=1 (ak + b). For this term, we can show that
Ψ2(x, z)−Ψ2(x′, z)=
R∑
r=1
nr(x,z)∑
k=1
(ak + b)−
R∑
r=1
nr(x
′,z)∑
k=1
(ak + b)
=
nxj (x,z)∑
k=1
(ak + b)+
nx′
j
(x,z)∑
k=1
(ak + b)−
nxj (x
′,z)∑
k=1
(ak + b)−
nx′
j
(x′,z)∑
k=1
(ak + b),
where the second equality holds because of the fact that nr(x, z) = nr(x
′, z) for all r 6= xj , x′j .
Noticing that nxj (x
′, z) = nxj (x, z)− 1 and nx′j (x, z) = nx′j (x′, z)− 1, we know that
Ψ2(x, z)−Ψ2(x′, z) = (anxj (z, x) + b)− (anx′j (z, x′) + b).
Finally, we define Ψ3(x, z) =
∑R
r=1
∑mr(x)
`=1 g(`). In this case, we can show that
Ψ3(x, z)−Ψ3(x′, z) =
R∑
r=1
mr(x)∑
`=1
g(`)−
R∑
r=1
mr(x
′)∑
`=1
g(`)
=
mxj (x)∑
`=1
g(`) +
mx′
j
(x)∑
`=1
g(`)−
mxj (x
′)∑
`=1
g(`)−
mx′
j
(x′)∑
`=1
g(`)
=g(mxj (x))− g(mx′j (x′)).
Therefore, we get
Ψ(x, z)−Ψ(x′, z) =Ψ1(x, z)−Ψ1(x′, z) + Ψ2(x, z)−Ψ2(x′, z) + βv0(Ψ3(x, z)−Ψ3(x′, z))
=ξtj(xj , T
t
j )− ξtj(x′j , T tj ) + vxj (x, z)− vx′j (x′, z) + βv0(g(mxj (x))− g(mx′j (x′)))
=Vj(xj , x−j , z)− Vj(x′j , x−j , z).
The proof for cars follows the same line of reasoning. 
Remark 2 Note that if v0 is greater than the average velocity of the flow, the trucks get paid to
use the road at the same time as their peers. This way the government incentivizes the trucks to
form platoons. This subsidy is technically the difference between the amount of the fuel that the
trucks would have saved if they formed a platoon at velocity v0 instead of the actual average velocity
of the traffic flow anr(z, x) + b. Therefore, the trucks would benefit from traveling together even at
low velocities (which is a scenario where the trucks do not increase their fuel efficiency significantly
through platooning). However, if v0 is smaller than the average velocity of the flow, we reduce the
extra utility that the trucks would receive from traveling together (and technically ptj(x, z) becomes
a tax rather than a subsidy). Therefore, it becomes less likely for the trucks to stick together. To
emphasize the fact that we are willing to pay the trucks rather than taxing them (and hence, dealing
with the first scenario), we call ptj(x, z) a subsidy.
4 Joint Strategy Fictitious Play
We start by briefly introducing the learning algorithm and, then, analyzing its convergence.
4.1 Learning Algorithm
Assume that the agents follow the joint strategy fictitious play algorithm [42]. To do so, the
agents calculate an average utility given the history of the actions. At time step t ∈ N0, car i ∈ JNK
computes Uˆi(r; t) using the recursive equation
Uˆi(r; t) = (1− λt)Uˆi(r; t− 1) + λtUi(r, z−i(t), x(t)), (12)
with the initial condition Uˆi(r;−1) = ξci (r, T ci ) for all r ∈ R. In (12), λt ∈ (0, 1] is a forgetting factor
which captures the extent that the agents forget the actions from the past. If λt = 1, the agents
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Algorithm 1 Joint strategy fictitious play for learning a Nash equilibrium.
Input: p ∈ (0, 1)
Output: (x∗, z∗)
1: for t = 0, 1, . . . do
2: for i = 1, . . . , N do
3: Calculate z′i ∈ arg maxr∈R Uˆi(r; t− 1)
4: if Ui(z
′
i, z−i(t− 1), x(t− 1)) ≤ Ui(zi(t− 1), z−i(t− 1), x(t− 1)) then
5: zi(t)← zi(t− 1)
6: else
7: With probability 1− p, zi(t)← zi(t− 1), otherwise zi(t)← z′i
8: end if
9: for j = 1, . . . ,M do
10: Calculate x′j ∈ arg maxr∈R Vˆj(r; t− 1)
11: if Vj(z(t− 1), x′j , x−j(t− 1)) ≤ Vj(z(t− 1), xj(t− 1), x−j(t− 1)) then
12: xj(t)← xj(t− 1)
13: else
14: With probability 1− p, xj(t)← xj(t− 1), otherwise xj(t)← x′j
15: end if
16: end for
17: end for
18: end for
are myopic (i.e., only consider the actions from the previous time step) while if λt = 1/t, the agents
value the whole history at the same level. Following the same approach, truck j ∈ JMK calculates
Vˆj(r; t) using the recursive equation
Vˆj(r; t) = (1− λt)Vˆj(r; t− 1) + λtVj(r, x−j(t), z(t)),
with Vˆj(r;−1) = ξtj(r, T tj ) for all r ∈ R. Algorithm 1 shows the joint strategy fictitious play for the
car–truck congestion game.
4.2 Convergence Analysis
Noting that with appropriate taxes the introduced congestion game is a potential game, we can use
the result of [42] to conclude the convergence of the learning algorithm.
Theorem 5 Let the action profile of the agents be generated by the joint strategy fictitious play in
Algorithm 1. Assume that λt = λ ∈ (0, 1) or λt = 1/t for all t ∈ N. Then, this action profile almost
surely converges to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the car–truck congestion game, if either the
cars pay the congestion tax pci (z, x) in (8) or the trucks receive the platooning subsidy p
t
j(x, z) in (11).
Proof: The proof is a consequence of combining Theorems 2.1 and 3.1 in [42] with Theorems 3
and 4. 
Note that the joint strategy fictitious play might be restrictive in some aspects. For instance, all
the agents must have access to all the individual decisions taken by the other agents to calculate the
average cost function. In the next section, we adapt the average strategy fictitious play introduced
in [27] as an alternative. This learning algorithm requires instead a central node to broadcast the
congestion prediction (i.e., an average of all the players actions) for all time intervals per day.
5 Average Strategy Fictitious Play
First, we introduce the average strategy fictitious play and study its convergence by extending parts
of the proofs in [27].
5.1 Learning Algorithm
Before introducing the learning algorithm, we have to make the following standing assumptions:
Assumption 1 The congestion tax policies satisfy
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• pci (z, x), i ∈ JNK, is only a function of nzi(x, z),mzi(x);
• ptj(x, z), j ∈ JMK, is only a function of nxj (x, z),mxj (x).
This assumption means that the congestion tax can only be function of the traffic flow rather than
the individual actions of the agents. The congestion taxing policy that we introduced in the previous
section satisfies this assumption. To emphasize this fact, from now on, we write pci (nzi(x, z),mzi(x))
and ptj(nxj (x, z),mxj (x)) with some abuse of notation.
Now, we can introduce the average strategy fictitious play. To initialize the algorithm, we let the
agents pick an arbitrary action from the set R at the first time step. We assume that there exists
a central node2 that can observe the traffic flow at each time interval. This central node uses the
following recursive update laws to calculate the average number of the cars and trucks in each time
interval
n¯cr(t) = (1− λ)n¯cr(t− 1) + λ
N∑
`=1
1{z`(t)=r},
n¯tr(t) = (1− λ)n¯tr(t− 1) + λ
M∑
`=1
1{x`(t)=r},
with n¯cr(0) =
∑N
`=1 1{z`(0)=r} and n¯
t
r(0) =
∑M
`=1 1{x`(0)=r} for all r ∈ R. The superscripts c and
t show that the aforementioned property is related to the cars or the trucks, respectively. In these
recursive update laws, we should choose the forgetting factor λ ∈ (0, 1) to capture the extent with
which we value the congestion information from the past. We can think of the numbers n¯cr(t) and
n¯tr(t) as the forecasts that the central node (e.g., the department of transportation, the radio station,
etc) announces on a day-to-day basis about the traffic flow for each time interval of the day. These
values have a memory to remember the congestion in earlier days and get updated based on the
actual observation of the traffic flow every midnight.
Additionally, car i ∈ JNK and truck j ∈ JMK keep track of the average number of times that they
have chosen r ∈ R following the recursive update laws
w¯cr,i(t) = (1− λ)w¯cr,i(t− 1) + λ1{zi(t)=r},
w¯tr,j(t) = (1− λ)w¯tr,j(t− 1) + λ1{xj(t)=r},
with w¯cr,i(0) = 1{zi(0)=r} and w¯
t
r,j(0) = 1{xj(0)=r} for all r ∈ R. Finally, for all i ∈ JNK and j ∈ JMK,
we define the new “average” cost functions in
V˜j(r; t) =[a(n¯
c
r(t) + n¯
t
r(t)− w¯tr,j(t) + 1) + b]
+ β[a(n¯cr(t) + n¯
t
r(t)− w¯tr,j(t) + 1) + b]g(n¯tr(t)− w¯tr,j(t) + 1)
+ ξtj(r, T
t
j ) + p
t
j(n¯
c
r(t) + n¯
t
r(t)− w¯tr,j(t) + 1, n¯tr(t)− w¯tr,j(t) + 1), (13a)
U˜i(r; t) =ξ
c
i (r, T
c
i ) + [a(n¯
c
r(t) + n¯
t
r(t)− w¯cr,i(t) + 1) + b]
+ pci (n¯
c
r(t) + n¯
t
r(t)− w¯cr,i(t) + 1, n¯tr(t)). (13b)
Now, if we follow Algorithm 2, we expect to converge to a Nash equilibrium.
5.2 Convergence Analysis
First, we need to prove an intermediate lemma which shows that if Algorithm 2 reaches a Nash
equilibrium, it stays there forever.
Lemma 6 Let each truck j ∈ JMK receive the subsidy
ptj(x, z) = β(v0 − (anxj (z, x) + b))mxj (x),
for a given v0 ∈ R. If x(t) and z(t), generated by Algorithm 2, is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium,
and zi(t) ∈ arg maxr∈R U˜i(r; t−1) for all i ∈ JNK and xj(t) ∈ arg maxr∈R V˜j(r; t−1) for all j ∈ JMK,
then x(t′) = x(t) and z(t′) = z(t) for all t′ ≥ t.
2This central node is assumed to be a not-for-profit organization. Therefore, it is not trying to optimize its income
or loss (i.e., the summation of the received taxes or the distributed subsidies) and, hence, it would not strategically
deviate from the intended algorithm. Certainly, introducing a mechanism with profitable organizations as a central
node can be a viable avenue for future research (to attract the private sector for implementing this part).
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Algorithm 2 Average strategy fictitious play for learning a Nash equilibrium.
Input: p ∈ (0, 1)
Output: (x∗, z∗)
1: for t = 1, 2, . . . do
2: for i = 1, . . . , N do
3: Calculate z′i ∈ arg maxr∈R U˜i(r; t− 1)
4: if Ui(z
′
i, z−i(t− 1), x(t− 1)) ≤ Ui(zi(t− 1), z−i(t− 1), x(t− 1)) then
5: zi(t)← zi(t− 1)
6: else
7: With probability 1− p, zi(t)← zi(t− 1), otherwise zi(t)← z′i
8: end if
9: for j = 1, . . . ,M do
10: Calculate x′j ∈ arg maxr∈R V˜j(r; t− 1)
11: if Vj(z(t− 1), x′j , x−j(t− 1)) ≤ Vj(z(t− 1), xj(t− 1), x−j(t− 1)) then
12: xj(t)← xj(t− 1)
13: else
14: With probability 1− p, xj(t)← xj(t− 1), otherwise xj(t)← x′j
15: end if
16: end for
17: end for
18: end for
Proof: The proof of this lemma follows the same line of reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 4.2
in [27]. Here, we only prove the results for the trucks as the proof for the cars is technically the
same. First, note that for all r ∈ R, we get
n¯cr(t) + n¯
t
r(t)− w¯tr(t)=(1−λ)n¯cr(t− 1)+λ
N∑
`=1
1{z`(t)=r}+(1−λ)n¯tr(t− 1)+λ
M∑
`=1
1{x`(t)=r}
− (1− λ)w¯tr,j(t− 1)− λ1{xj(t)=r}
=(1−λ)(n¯cr(t− 1)+n¯tr(t− 1)−w¯tr(t− 1))+λ(nr(x(t), z(t))−1{xj(t)=r}),
(14a)
n¯tr(t)− w¯tr,j(t) = (1− λ)n¯tr(t− 1) + λ
M∑
`=1
1{x`(t)=r} − (1− λ)w¯tr,j(t− 1)− λ1{xj(t)=r}
= (1− λ)(n¯tr(t− 1)− w¯tr,j(t− 1)) + λ(mr(x(t))− 1{xj(t)=r}).
(14b)
Now, using these update laws and the proposed subsidy policy in (11), we get
V˜j(r; t) = ξ
t
j(r, T
t
j ) + a(n¯
c
r(t) + n¯
t
r(t)− w¯tr(t) + 1) + b+ βv0(n¯tr(t)− w¯tr,j(t) + 1)
= ξtj(r, T
t
j ) + a(1− λ)(n¯cr(t− 1) + n¯tr(t− 1)− w¯tr(t− 1))+a(λ(nr(x(t), z(t))−1{xj(t)=r})+1)
+ b+ βv0(1− λ)(n¯tr(t− 1)− w¯tr,j(t− 1)) + βv0(λ(mr(x(t))− 1{xj(t)=r}) + 1)
= (1− λ)V˜j(r; t− 1) + λVj(r, x−j(t), z(t)).
Therefore, we can prove that
V˜j(xj(t);t)=(1−λ)V˜j(xj(t); t− 1)+λVj(xj(t), x−j(t),z(t))
≥(1−λ)V˜j(r; t− 1)+λVj(r, x−j(t), z(t))
=V˜j(r; t)
for any r ∈ R, where the inequality is direct consequence of the fact that the pair x(t) and z(t)
is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium and xj(t) ∈ arg maxr∈R V˜j(r; t − 1) for all j ∈ JMK. Thus,
xj(t) ∈ arg maxr∈R V˜j(r; t) and as a result, we get xj(t + 1) = xj(t) (following Algorithm 2). Now,
using a simple mathematical induction, we can show xj(t+ k) = xj(t) for all k ∈ N. 
Theorem 7 Let the action profile of the agents be generated by the average strategy fictitious play
in Algorithm 2. Then, this action profile almost surely converges to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
of the car–truck congestion game, if the trucks receive the platooning subsidy ptj(x, z) in (11).
Proof: The proof follows from using Theorem 4 and Lemma 6 in the proof of Theorem 4.1 in [27].

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Figure 3: nr(x(t), z(t)), r ∈ R, versus the iteration number for β = 10−3 when using the joint strategy fictitious play
in Algorithm 1 with p = 0.4 and λt = 3× 10−2 for all t ∈ N0.
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Figure 4: Number of the vehicles in each time interval for β = 10−3 when using the joint strategy fictitious play in
Algorithm 1 with p = 0.4 and λt = 3× 10−2 for all t ∈ N0.
6 Numerical Example
Let us assume that N = 10000 cars and M = 100 trucks are using the segment of the highway
illustrated in Figure 1 from 7:00am to 9:00am on a daily basis. We divide the time horizon into
eight equal non-overlapping intervals. Hence, we fix the action set as R = {1, . . . , 8}, where each
number represents an interval of 15 min. Let T ci , i ∈ JNK, be randomly chosen from the set R using
the discrete distribution
P{T ci = n} =
 1/6, n = 2, 4,1/4, n = 3,
1/12, otherwise.
Let us also use a similar probability distribution to extract T tj , j ∈ JMK. Hence, we consider the
case where the drivers statistically prefer to use the road at r = 3 which corresponds to 7:30am to
7:45am. Let αci , i ∈ JNK, and αtj , j ∈ JMK, be randomly generated following a uniform distribution
within the interval [−7.5,−2.5]. Finally, let a = −0.0110 and b = 84.9696 as discussed in Section 2.
6.1 Learning Algorithm Performance
In this subsection, we start by simulating the joint strategy fictitious play in Algorithm 1. Let us fix
β = 10−3, p = 0.4, and λt = 3× 10−2 for all t ∈ N0. Figure 3 illustrates the number of the vehicles
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Figure 6: Number of the vehicles and the average velocity of the traffic flow in each time interval for the case where
the drivers neglect the congestion in their decision making (blue) and for the learned pure strategy Nash equilibrium
(red).
(both cars and trucks) that are using a specific time interval to commute nr(x(t), z(t)), r ∈ R, as
a function of the iteration number. As can be seen in this figure, the learning algorithm converges
to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in this example relatively fast3. Figure 4 shows the evolution
of the traffic distribution. Figure 5 shows the number of trucks mr(x(t)), r ∈ R, that are using the
road on various time intervals. For instance, at the learned Nash equilibrium, thirty trucks use the
time interval 7:45am to 8:00am while at the same time, most of them avoid using 7:15am to 7:30am
because it is highly congested (and they would not save much fuel if they commute at this time).
6.2 Nash Equilibrium Efficiency
Figure 6 shows the number of the vehicles in each time interval and the corresponding average
velocity in that time interval. The blue color denotes the case where the drivers do not consider
the congestion in their decision making; i.e., they commute whenever pleases them, zi = T
c
i for all
i ∈ JNK and xj = T tj for all j ∈ JMK. The red color denotes the case where the drivers implement
the pure strategy Nash equilibrium that they have learned using Algorithm 1. As we can see in this
figure, the proposed congestion game reduces the average commuting time (increases the average
3Recall that there are |R|M+N possible action combinations in a car–truck congestion game. Therefore, in this
example, we have 810100 ' 109100 possible action combinations. To put this number into perspective, recall that there
are around 1080 atoms in the visible universe.
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velocity). Following [60], we can define the social cost
S(x, z) = min
r∈R
vr(z, x)
= min
r∈R
anr(x, z) + b
= a(max
r∈R
nr(x, z)) + b,
where the last equality holds because of the fact that a < 0. This social cost is the worst-case average
velocity of the traffic flow4. Another definition of social cost could be the total fuel consumption
or the overall carbon emission. In a utopia, the government should be able to implement a global
solution of the optimization problem
(x•, z•) ∈ arg max
(z,x)∈RN×RM
S(x, z),
to achieve the lowest congestion at all time intervals. However, this solution cannot be implemented
in a society with strategic (selfish) agents since they have no incentive for following a socially optimal
decision (x•, z•). Note that since a < 0, we have
(x•, z•) ∈ arg max
(z,x)∈RN×RM
min
r∈R
anr(x, z) + b
∈ arg min
(z,x)∈RN×RM
max
r∈R
nr(x, z),
and as a result, we get
S(x•, z•) = a
⌈
N +M
|R|
⌉
+ b
= 71.0766 km/h.
Therefore, we have
S(x•, z•)
S(x∗, z∗)
= 1.1048,
which shows that the acquired pure strategy Nash equilibrium (x∗, z∗) is not efficient with respect
to the introduced welfare function5. However, it is somewhat better than the case where the drivers
do not consider the congestion in their decision making (i.e. they travel whenever pleases them) as
S(x•, z•)
S({T tj }Mj=1, {T ci }Ni=1)
= 1.2330.
6.3 Robustness of the Learning Algorithm
Let us now consider the case where on the fiftieth day of learning (i.e., iteration t = 50) an unexpected
behavior (e.g., a traffic accident) significantly decreases the average velocity of the traffic flow during
7:15am and 8:00am (i.e., for r = 2, 3, 4). To reflect this matter in the simulations, we assume that on
the fiftieth iteration, the average velocity for r = 2, 3, 4 is given by (anr(x(t), z(t)) + b)/10. Figure 7
illustrates the number of vehicles that are using a specific time interval to commute nr(x(t), z(t)),
r ∈ R, as a function of the iteration numbers. Note that there is a sudden drop in the number of
the vehicles that are using the time intervals corresponding to r = 2, 3, 4 for a while (around twenty
iterations) after the accident. However, the learning process recovers the Nash equilibrium after
another fifty iterations.
4This cost function is an example of a Rawlsian social cost function (i.e., the worst-case cost function of the players).
Another possible choice of social cost function is a utilitarian social cost function (i.e., summation of the individual
cost functions of all the players); see [61, p. 413] for more information regarding the difference between these two
categories of social cost functions.
5It is worth mentioning that if we choose the potential function Φ in Theorem 3 as the social welfare function, the
learned Nash equilibrium is indeed efficient since Algorith, 1 results in a local maximizer of this potential function.
However, such a choice does not have any practical implications.
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Figure 8: Number of the trucks in each time interval for various choices of the coefficient β.
6.4 Effect of the Fuel-Saving Coefficient
In this subsection, we aim at illustrating the effect of the fuel-saving coefficient β on the behavior
of the trucks. We perform all the simulations using the joint strategy fictitious play introduced in
Algorithm 1 with p = 0.4 and λt = 3× 10−2 for all t ∈ N0. Figure 8 illustrates the number of trucks
for the learned Nash equilibrium at different time intervals for various choices of the coefficient β.
As we expect, when β = 0, the trucks are reluctant to platoon (but instead stick to the time that
favors them the most). However, as we increase the coefficient β, a higher number of trucks drive at
the same time interval. Note that for β = 4× 10−3, all hundred trucks use the road during exactly
one time interval (i.e, 8:00am to 8:15am).
6.5 Drivers Having Different Time Values
In 2001, the consulting firm Inregia in Sweden, by the request of Swedish Institute for Transport
and Communications Analysis, performed a survey to estimate the value of time for the road users
in Stockholm [37, 53]. This study showed that various groups of people value their time differently.
According to the study, drivers valued time as 0.98, 3.30, and 0.19 SEK/min for work and school
commuting trips, business trips, and other trips, respectively [37, 53]. Let us include this effect in
the introduced congestion game setup. Assume that in the utility of car i ∈ JNK, we set the term
pci (z, x) = δ
−1
i
aβ mzi (x)∑
`=1
g(`)
,
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Figure 10: Number of the cars in each time interval for the case where the drivers value their time differently
subtracted by number of the cars in each time interval for the case where their drivers value the time equally.
where δi > 0 is the value of time for the driver of car i. For work and school commuting trips, we
scale the value of time to δi = 1.00. Therefore, we get δi = 3.37 and δi = 0.19 for business trips and
other trips, respectively. Now, allow us to randomly distribute the cars into three groups of work
and school trips, business trips, and other trips with probabilities 0.754, 0.036, 0.210, respectively,
as suggested in [37]. Figure 9 shows the number of trucks in each time interval as a function of the
iteration number in this case. Comparing with Figure 5, we can clearly see that in this example,
the difference in the value of time has not changed the behavior of trucks (certainly in the Nash
equilibrium, but the transient response is different). Figure 10 shows the number of the cars in each
time interval for the case where the drivers value their time differently subtracted by number of the
cars in each time interval for the case where the drivers value their time equally. Clearly, the cars
that value their time the most, or equivalently, the ones that are willing to pay higher congestion
taxes (i.e., δi = 1.00, 3.37), can move to the time interval where thirty trucks are traveling. However,
the cars that do not value their time much (i.e., δi = 0.19) switch to a less expensive alternative.
6.6 Trucks with and Without Platooning Equipment
Few trucks are currently fitted with platooning equipments. In this subsection, we try to understand
the influence of this matter on the properties of the learned Nash equilibrium. To illustrate the
effect of trucks without platooning equipment, let us consider two types of trucks where the first
type can indeed participate in platoons and the second type does not have the necessary equipments
for doing so. We count the second type of trucks as ordinary cars since they do not benefit from
traveling at the same time interval as the other trucks. Hence, N shows the number of ordinary cars
together with the trucks without platooning equipment and M denotes the number of trucks that
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Figure 11: Number of the vehicles in each time interval for the learned pure strategy Nash equilibrium for various
choices of M/(M +N).
can potentially participate in forming the platoons. We fix N + M = 10000. Figure 11 illustrates
the number of the trucks that have platooning equipment in each time interval for various ratios of
M/(M +N). Evidently, the number of the trucks (with platooning equipment) in most of the time
intervals grows linearly with M/(M +N) (as we expect since there are more trucks). However, some
of the intervals, such as, 7:30am to 7:45am become less favorable (as they are highly congested) and
the trucks in these intervals completely move to their neighboring intervals as M/(M +N) increases.
6.7 Announcing Congestion Taxes in Advance
A drawback of the presented formulation is that the congestion taxes are dynamic and must be cal-
culated (and enforced) instantly based on the number of the vehicles in each time interval. Although
dynamic congestion taxing has been implemented on several occasions (e.g., San Diego I-15 High-
Occupancy Toll Lanes in which the tolls vary dynamically with the level of congestion [62]), they
proved to be controversial (or, cumbersome to understand for the drivers at the least). Therefore,
one might consider the case in which the tolls for day t+D are announced at the end of day t for all
t ∈ N0 (so that the drivers have time to digest this information and act accordingly). To simulate
such a scenario, we note that the congestion tax pci (t) that car i ∈ JNK must pay for using the road
at time interval zi(t) ∈ R on iteration t ∈ N0 is equal
pci (t) =
{
aβ
∑mzi(t)(x(t−D))
`=1 g(`), t > D,
0, otherwise.
Figure 12 illustrates the number of the vehicles for each time interval nr(x(t), z(t)), r ∈ R, versus
the iteration number when the congestion tax is updated with a delay of D = 30 days. Evidently,
there are more oscillations in comparison to Figure 3, however, the algorithm converges rapidly to a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
6.8 Average Strategy Fictitious Play
In this subsection, we use the average strategy fictitious play with β = 10−3, λ = 3 × 10−2, and
p = 0.4. We also implement the platooning subsidy in Theorem 4 with v0 = 85. Figure 13 illustrates
nr(x(t), z(t)), r ∈ R, versus the iteration number. The proposed algorithm clearly converges to a
Nash equilibrium relatively fast.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We introduced a model for traffic flow on a specific road at various time intervals per day using an
atomic congestion game with two types of agents (namely, cars and trucks). Cars only optimize their
trade-off between using the road at the time they prefer, the average velocity of the traffic flow, and
the congestion tax they are paying. However, trucks benefit from using the road at the same time as
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strategy fictitious play in Algorithm 2.
the other trucks. We motivated this extra utility using an increased possibility of platooning with
the other trucks and as a result, saving fuel. We used congestion data from Stockholm to validate the
linear relationship between the average velocity of commuting and the number of the vehicles that
are using the road at that time. We devised appropriate tax or subsidy policies to create a potential
game. Then, we used the joint strategy fictitious play and the average strategy fictitious play to
learn a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this game. We conducted a comprehensive simulation
study to analyze the effect of different factors on the properties of the learned Nash equilibrium. As
a future work, we can consider using mechanism design tools to enforce a socially optimal solution,
such as, an optimal carbon emission profile, through appropriate congestion tax policy. Finally, in
this paper, we did not consider the routing aspects of the problem. It would be of great interest
in future research to combine the departure-time selection and the route selection problems in the
context of understanding the platooning incentives.
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